The Campaign in the U.S. |
In the United
States, a number of groups during the 1980s
and 90s had pushed the idea of debt relief (e.g. the Debt Crisis Network, Debt
Action Coalition) to no avail. In April 1997, Jubilee 2000/USA was launched
after meetings between British activists and U.S. citizens interested in the
debt issue. The effort was joined by a grass roots movement of debt relief
organizations, church groups and celebrities (most prominently the lead singer
for U2, Bono).
Jubilee 2000/USA succeeded in influencing gate-keeping, policymakers in a way that previous efforts had not. President Clinton was an early convert to the idea, but most observers thought the group would have little luck with the Republican leadership of the Congress; a group that had traditionally opposed any foreign aid. Nonetheless, Jubilee 2000/USA managed to get these lawmakers on board during the waning years of the Clinton administration. In his article Bono Made Jesse Helms Cry: Jubilee 2000, Debt Relief, and Moral Action in International Politics, Joshua Busby outlines the three primary appeals that induced U.S. lawmakers to support debt relief: (1) an appeal to the technocratic efficiency, (2) an appeal to religious principles, and (3) political pressure from church-going constituents. This combination of appeals, Busby argues, allowed debt relief advocacy in the United States to rise from obscurity and make political headway. Busby writes
Because the United States development advocacy sector is smaller than the United Kingdom, there was no large mass movement to generate political pressure. Nonetheless, the religious frame resonated with churchgoers. Members of Congress began to get mail, phone calls, and visits in their districts in small but significant numbers. Campaigners like Bono inductively learned the importance of connecting directly with gatekeepers. Realizing that Clinton’s support would not be enough, Bono’s guiding questions for lobbying became, “Who can stop this from happening?” and “Who’s the Elvis here?” Advocates began to cultivate ties with Republican committee chairs and build support from unlikely quarters. After the President’s announcement, Bono came to the United States and made links with the Administration, including Larry Summers and members of Congress...
Three prominent actors, Larry Summers (Democratic Secretary of the Treasury), John Kasich (Republican Chairman of the House Budget Committee), and Jim Leach (Republican Chairman of the House Banking Committee) were all persuaded debt relief was the right thing to do based on technocratic ideas. While Treasury had concerns debt relief would cut poor countries off from capital markets, Larry Summers ultimately recognized those countries were unlikely to be getting much access. Moreover, in Summers’s view, there was no good reason to maintain the pretense that these countries were creditworthy. Continuing defensive lending so countries could payoff old loans with new loans was ‘‘phony.’’ Because these debts were not going to be paid anyway, this was sound financial practice to write them off. Like Summers, John Kasich found this appealing. According to Scott Hatch, a former GOP leadership staffer and confidante of Kasich, the Congressman responded because he thought debt relief was a viable way to free up resources for poor countries to spend on education and health care. Jim Leach’s support was motivated by a similar dynamic. Jamie McCormick, former staff to Leach’s committee, suggested the Congressman thought debt relief was the right thing to do, noting that Leach came at the issue more from a financial perspective than a religious one…
Aside from activists and leaders like Pat Roberston, prominent Congressional Republicans Spencer Bachus (Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Banking) and Jesse Helms (Chairman of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee) in particular, found the religious message compelling. Asked about his position, Bachus said, “This bill is a gift of life. Jubilee 2000 is a celebration of the 2000th birthday of Christ… What more appropriate time to give to these poor in celebration of the birth of Jesus, who gave us life?”…Like Bachus, Helms was moved by his faith. Mark Lagon, former senior staff to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee under Helms, suggested the Senator had been reached by Christian conservatives before his meeting with Bono. That meeting left Helms a ‘‘bit choked up about children in need’’ even as he insisted that debt relief not end up supporting corruption. Why had not Helms and others experienced this epiphany earlier? Part of the story is about agency by advocates. The appeal to them on religious grounds had not been done. Helms’ support was not foreordained, but an appeal based on religious morality was more likely to succeed in the United States than less religious places, particularly among lawmakers like Helms who had a record of policy decisions guided by moral concerns...
Gatekeepers that remained opposed to debt relief Sonny Callahan (Republican chairman of a House Subcommittee on Appropriations) and Phil Gramm (Republican Chairman of the Senate Banking Committee) appear to have been moved by political pressure, lobbying, and shaming. In the weeks before the October 2000 vote, Pat Robertson asked Texas viewers of the 700 Club to “let Senator Gramm know that this is a good initiative”…Callahan suggested he and other members of Congress were ultimately responsive because they were getting a lot of flak in their districts from the church community. “I was always swimming upstream,” Callahan said, “but I had a powerful enough oar to delay” the appropriation for foreign operations “against the will of a majority of Congress.” Realizing supporters had the votes to amend the appropriations bill on the floor, Callahan let the appropriation for debt relief go forward. As Callahan admitted, “The debt relief issue is now a speeding train.We’ve got the Pope and every missionary in the world involved in this thing, and they persuaded just about everyone here that this is the noble thing to do.” So, while moral reasons motivated many supporters, opponents found themselves subject to the piety of their peers, evidence that a well-chosen frame can elicit the semi-coercive pressures of social shaming in the absence of a well-financed campaign.
While Jubilee campaigners were successful in gaining agreement within the Congress about US bilateral debt by the end of the Jubilee year, they fell short in getting U.S. leaders to agree on a plan to force the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund to forgive the HIPC debt owed them. Lobbying therefore continued with campaigners like Bono meeting with new President George W. Bush on debt relief (see photo above).
Links
To read Joshua Busby's complete article Bono Made Jesse Helms Cry: Jubilee 2000, Debt Relief, and Moral Action in International Politics, click here.
A New York Times story on the success of the debt relief campaign in the United States can be read here.
Read about rock star Bono's involvement with Jubilee 2000.
Read Jesse Helms' account of Bono's visit to him.